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FROM THE SOURCE TO THE MOUTH: WHAT CAN YOU
REASONABLY EXPECT TO FIND IN YOUR FOOD?
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, American parents trying to instill good eating habits
in their children encourage them to eat raw fruit and vegetables rather
than processed, sugar-loaded snacks. But while choosing natural
foods for children may cut down on the annual pediatric dental bill,
are we really ensuring a safe and healthy diet for our children?
In 1989, for example, as conscientious parents directed their chil-
dren to drink apple and other fruit juices, it was disclosed that apples
and apple products were contaminated with the cancer-causing cheim-
cal Alar.1 Children had been exposed to a pesticide risk several hun-
dred times greater than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
claimed was acceptable.2 And if apples are risky, what about those
purple fruit drinks containing color additives and processed foods
which claim to be fortified with high potency vitamin supplements?
How safe are they, and by what standards?
Tis Note discusses the phases of food production from the ground
to the table, and the potential risks to consumers at each stage. Part I
presents the federal statutory framework regarding adulterated foods.
It raises the distinction between a "food" and a "food additive," and
defines "adulterated" food and its corresponding tolerance levels.
Part II addresses issues about the growth phase of food and accompa-
nying pesticide use, and concludes that although recent reports re-
garding high exposure to carcinogenic chemicals are extremely
alarming, the government is aware of the problem and is proposing
major reform designed to reduce the use of chemicals in the produc-
tion of the country's food. Part III looks at the food processing phase
which often involves the use of additives. This section discusses the
various amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA or the Act) regarding food additives and current proposals
aimed at the regulation and restriction of vitamin and nutrient supple-
ments. Finally, Part IV analyzes strict liability, breach of implied war-
ranty and negligence, the causes of action available to the unfortunate
consumer of adulterated food. This section defines and explains the
three tests applied by states to determine a food vendor's liability, and
encourages the use of the "reasonable expectation" test because it
promotes the fairest result for both the consumer and vendor.
1. Id Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F Supp. 928,930 (E.D. Wash. 1992) [here-
mafter Auvil 1].
2. Id. at 939.
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I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING ADULTERATED FOOD
A. "Food" vs. "Food Additive"
The first federal statute governing food safety was the Food and
Drug Act of 1906. 3 The Act declared that food was "adulterated" if it
contained any poisonous additive or added substance which may
render it injurious to health.4 The concept of an "added" substance,
while not explicitly defined, was understood to mean substances inten-
tionally incorporated into food as ingredients or applied during
processing.5
In 1938, in an effort to further ensure the purity of the nation's food
supply, Congress broadened its control over toxicants in food by en-
acting the present FDCA.6 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is the agency which, as the designee of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, enforces the Act.7
The Act defines "food" as: "(1) articles used for food or drink for
man or other animals, (2) chewing gum and (3) articles used for com-
ponents of any such article."8 According to the 1938 Act, substances
defined as food are presumed safe and the FDA must, in order to
deem them adulterated, show that the food contains a poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.9 And if
the harmful substance is not one which is added to the food, then it is
not considered adulterated if the quantity of the substance does not
ordinarily render it injurious to health.10 Thus, while both the 1906
and the 1938 Acts retained the distinction between substances that
were added and those that were not, neither clearly defined what con-
stitutes "added.""
This confusion was somewhat ameliorated in 1958 with the enact-
ment of the Food Additives Amendment. 2 The term "food additive"
was defined as:
3. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 902, 52 Stat. 1040, 1059; see Burke Pest Control,
Inc. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 438 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (history of
federal legislation of adulterated food).
4. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (repealed 1938).
5. Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to
the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 77 MicH. L.
REv 171, 174 (1978).
6. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 402, 52 Stat. 1046
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1988)).
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393 (1988).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (1988).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Lexington Mill and
Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1914); United States v. 29 Cartons of An
Article of Food, 987 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter 29 Cartons 1].
10. Burke Pest Control, 438 So. 2d at 97.
11. Id.
12. Section 201 of the FDCA was enacted as part of the Food Additives Amend-
ment of 1958, 72 Stat. 1784 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1988)).
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Any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably
be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a com-
ponent or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (in-
cluding any substance for use in producing, manufacturing, packing,
processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting or holding
food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such
use, if such substance is not generally recognized among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety
as having been adequately shown through scientific procedures..
to be safe under the conditions of its intended use .... )13
The Food Additives Amendment, m addition to clarifying what sub-
stances are considered "added," also allocated the burden of proof for
food additives quite differently than that for food. 4 Section 342(a)(1)
presumes food to be safe and places the burden of proving injury on
the government. However, with respect to food additives,' 5 the Food
Additives Amendment allows the FDA to "prevent the sale of prod-
ucts containing a food additive unless and until the processor shows
that the substance, when added to food, is generally recognized as safe
(in the vernacular, 'GRAS').' ' 6
In sum then, to be labeled a "food additive," a substance must: (1)
be intended or reasonably expected to become a component of food
or to otherwise affect the characteristic of food; and (2) not be GRAS.
Thus, the Act creates an important distinction between "food" and
"food additives" which will often be the determining factor for a
plaintiff seeking redress or in determining a purveyor's liability. This
distinction also significantly affects the ease with which the FDA may
regulate a substance's sale.
An illustration of this critical distinction can be seen in a series of
recent cases regarding black currant oil (BCO).17 BCO is often taken
as a dietary supplement and can be ingested m liqud or capsule form.
BCO is obtained by squeezing black currant berry seeds and is com-
posed of a umque fatty-acid structure.'8
In United States v 29 Cartons of . . An Article of Food (29 Cartons
1) the government sought, on appeal, to condemn cartons of encapsu-
lated black currant oil alleging that the oil was a "food additive" of
questionable safety.' 9 The question before the First Circuit was
13. Id.
14. See 29 Cartons I, 987 F.2d at 35.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. 29 Cartons I, 987 F.2d at 35 (construing S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5300, 5301-02).
17. See United States v. Two Plastic Drums, More or Less of an Article of Food,
Labeled in Part: Viponte, Ltd. Black Currant Oil Batch No. BOOSF 039, 984 F.2d
814 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Two Plastic Drums]; 29 Cartons 1, 987 F.2d at 33;
United States v. 29 Cartons, More or Less, of an Article of Food, 792 F Supp. 139 (D.
Mass. 1992) [hereinafter 29 Cartons M1].
18. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d at 816.
19. 987 F.2d at 35-36.
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whether these capsules should be classified as a "food" or as a "food
additive."'20
The court analyzed the components of a capsule which were pure
BCO encased in a plasticizer composed of gelatin and glycerin
(neither of which has any independent food value). The court stated
that "a capsule serves a dual purpose as a container... and as a pro-
phylactic (protecting the BCO from rancidity)."'"
The FDA took the position that the capsules were composed of
three consumable components - BCO, gelatin and glycerin, and that
each of these three ingredients was subject to potential regulation as a
"food additive."22 Defendant, on the other hand, argued "that the
BCO contained in the seized capsule [was] itself a food.., and that its
sale in a convenient carmer medium [did] not transmogrify it into a
food additive."'
In holding that the capsules were "food" rather than "food addi-
tive," the court relied on the reasoning of a factually similar case,
United States v. Two Plastic Drums,24 which had been decided by the
Seventh Circuit several months earlier. Focusing on the language of
the statute, both courts held that a substance was a "food additive" if,
when added to food, it effects or could be expected to effect some
change m the food. The fact that a substance was a component of a
multicomponent substance did not render it a food additive.2 The
court interpreted the phrase "becoming a component or otherwise af-
fecting the characteristics of any food"' as targeting "only those com-
ponents that 'have the purpose or effect of altering a food's
characteristics." 27 Simply put, BCO was the only active ingredient in
the capsules and it was not being used for its effect on glycerin or
gelatm.28
In a similar case, United States v. 21 Approximately 180 KG. Bulk
Metal Drums, More or Less, of an Article of Food and Drug.. .,29 the
court came to the opposite conclusion, finding that the capsules in
question were a food additive30 The case involved BCO capsules as
well as capsules containing Evening Primrose Oil (EPO).3' The de-
20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id.
24. 984 F.2d at 814.
25. 29 Cartons I, 987 F.2d at 37.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1988).
27. 29 Cartons 1, 987 F.2d at 37 (quoting Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d at 818)
(emphasis added).
28. 29 Cartons 1, 987 F.2d at 38.
29. 761 F. Supp. 180 (D. Me. 1991) [hereinafter 21 Bulk Metal Drums].
30. Id.
31. Evening Primrose Oil is made from crushed seeds of the evening primrose
plant and is sold by some compames as a dietary supplement. No regulatory approval
exists for EPO as a food additive as defined by the FDA. Id. at 183.
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fendant had been distributing promotional materials claiming that the
capsules helped "to prevent, treat, or cure a broad array of maladies
ranging from atopic dermatitis to cancer, obesity, and schizophre-
nia."32 In this case, however, the defendant had combined these two
oils with other vitamins, minerals and fish oil and then encapsulated
the ingredients.33
Since these capsules contained ingredients other than the pure oil,
the Court found that under these circumstances, the BCO and EPO
were food additives; therefore, according to the statute, the capsules
were presumptively unsafe. The defendant provided insufficient in-
formation to justify approval of BCO as an additive as required by the
Act and the court found that there was no regulation or exemption in
effect permitting the use of BCO.34 Thus, the court held that BCO
was an adulterated food additive subject to condemnation. 5
B. "Adulterated" Food and Tolerance Levels
As previously mentioned, under the FDCA, a food is adulterated if
it contains a poisonous or deleterious substance in a quantity that or-
dinarily renders the food injurious to health.36 If the harmful sub-
stance is an added substance, then the food is deemed adulterated
even without direct proof that the food could be injurious to health as
long as the added substance is considered "unsafe" pursuant to sec-
tion 346.31 The term unsafe has been defined as "[any quantity of
32. Id. at 182.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 185. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1988).
35. 21 Bulk Metal Drums, 761 F Supp. at 185. See also 21 U.S.C. § 334(d)(1988).
36. Food is deemed to be "adulterated"-
(1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health; but m case the substance is not an added sub-
stance such food shall not be considered adulterated under tins clause if the
quantity of such substance m such food does not ordinarily render it injuri-
ous to health; or (2) (A) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added
deleterious substance (other than [exceptions]) winch is unsafe within the
meaning of Sec. 346a(a) of tis title
21 U.S.C. § 342(a). See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
37. Section 346 states:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where
such substance is required m the production thereof or cannot be avoided by
good manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of
the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of tlus title; but when such
substance is so required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall promul-
gate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he
finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceed-
ing the limit so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the
application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of this title. While such a regu-
lation is in effect food shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any
added amount of such substance, be considered to be adulterated..
21 U.S.C. § 346 (1988).
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added poisonous or added deleterious substance, unless the substance
is required in food production or cannot be avoided by good manufac-
turing practice."3
Section 346 states that under circumstances where a poisonous or
deleterious substance has been unavoidably added to food, the Secre-
tary shall promulgate regulations limiting the amount of the ingredi-
ent to the extent he finds necessary to protect the public health.39 A
regulation pursuant to section 346 is known as a "tolerance" 40 which is
defined as the maximum concentration of a substance allowed by
law.41
Tolerance levels are established by a process similar to formal rule-
making which includes evidentiary hearings.42 When appropriate, the
FDA may refrain from setting tolerance levels and instead establish
"action levels" which involve a less formal procedure.43 In addition to
protecting the consumer, establishing an action level assures the food
producers that the FDA will not enforce the general adulteration pro-
visions against them, as long as the quantity of the harmful added sub-
stance does not exceed the quantity specified by the action level.44 In
limited circumstances, the FDA will set neither tolerance nor action
levels, but rather it will grant an exemption from the requirement of a
tolerance.45
In 1986, the Supreme Court wrestled with the subject of tolerance
and action levels in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute.46 Two
public interest groups and an individual consumer brought suit against
the Commissioner of the FDA alleging that, under the Act, the FDA
was required to set a tolerance level for aflatoxin before allowing it to
be shipped in interstate commerce.47 Aflatoxm, a powerful carcino-
gen produced by a fungal mold, grows in certain foods (in this case,
corn); it is indisputably poisonous and deleterious under sections 342
and 346.4
Both parties agreed that although aflatoxin is naturally and un-
avoidably present in some foods, it was to be treated as "added" to
food under section 346. 49 Since aflatoxm was a poisonous and delete-
rious substance added to food, it was potentially the subject of a toler-
38. Young, 476 U.S. at 977.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 346.
40. Young, 476 U.S. at 979.
41. See American Grain Prod. v. Department of Pub. Health, 467 N.E.2d 455, 460
n.5 (Mass. 1984).
42. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1988).
43. See Young, 470 U.S. at 977.
44. Id.
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1988) (exception for conformity with exemption or
regulation).
46. Young, 476 U.S. at 974.
47 Id. at 978.
48. Id. at 977-78.
49. Id. at 978.
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ance level.50 The FDA, however, had not set a section 346 tolerance
for aflatoxrn, but instead had established an action level of 20 parts
per billion (ppb).5 '
The problem arose in 1980 when the FDA stated in the Federal
Register that it would not recommend regulatory action for violation
of the FDCA regarding shipments of corn harvested in North Caro-
lina, South Carolina and Virginia which contained no more than 100
ppb of aflatoxin.52 The notice further specified that the corn contain-
mg aflatoxin was to be used only as feed for mature, non-lactating
livestock and mature poultry.5 3 In response to this notice, plaintiffs
brought suit against the Commissioner. The district court ruled that
the FDA need not establish a tolerance level for aflatoxm and that the
tainted corn could be allowed into interstate commerce.54
The court of appeals reversed, claiming that the language of the
statute unambiguously addressed the issue.55 Specifically, the court
interpreted the phrase "but when such substance is so required or can-
not be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting
the quantity theren" 56 as a directive to the Secretary to establish a
tolerance.57 The court further stated that the phrase "to such extent
as he finds necessary" did not diminish the focal word "shall."5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether regulations
were necessary to protect the public health was a determination to be
made by the FDA.59 Thus, "the FDA enjoys complete discretion not
to employ the enforcement provisions of the FDC Act, and those de-
cisions are not subject to judicial review. '60 In sum, the provisions of
the Act authorize, but do not compel, the FDA to undertake enforce-
ment activity. 61
II. Tim GROWTH PHAsE: ExPosuRE TO PEsTICIDEs
Having presented the federal statutory framework for adulterated
foods, we can now address issues which arise regarding the safety of
food as it moves through the various stages of production.
The first phase of concern to the consumer is the risk posed by the
use of pesticides during a food's growth phase. This risk was high-
lighted when the New York Times printed an article claiming that in-
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 978-79.
55. Id. at 979.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (emphasis added).
57. Young, 476 U.S. at 979.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 979-81.
60. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
61. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985).
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fants and children may be uniquely sensitive to pesticides.62 The
article raised concerns similar to the CBS "60 Minutes" broadcast in
1989, which persuaded much of the public to boycott apples because
some of them were sprayed with Alar.63
The New York Times reported that children "consume more calo-
nes per umt of body weight and tend to eat fewer types of food than
adults."'64 The article also stated that millions of American children
receive up to thirty-five percent of their entire lifetime dose of carci-
nogenic pesticides by the time they are five years old.65
Efforts to curb the use of pesticides began in the 1960's by groups
advocating measures such as orgamc farming, but these efforts have
only recently begun to receive popular support.66 In 1985, for exam-
ple, stricter pesticide regulations were presented to the House of
Representatives. 67
In 1987, a National Academy of Sciences report claimed "that the
nation's food supply was inadequately protected from cancer-causing
pesticides. '68 Two years later, the year of the Alar alert, the National
Resources Defense Council released its report Intolerable Risk: Pesti-
cides in Our Children's Food.69 However, the federal government did
nothing significant to alter the pesticide regulations.70
The New York Times article indicated that some major changes di-
rected at reducing pesticide use would be enacted in the future.71 In
the meantime, however, it is important to be aware of the kinds of
issues which arise from the interaction of the two statutes currently
governing pesticides and food: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)72 and the FDCA.
A. History of FIFRA
Over the past century, the use of pesticides to control weeds and
mminimze crop damage caused by insects, disease, and ammals has
become increasingly more important for American agriculture.
While pesticide use has led to improvements in productivity, it has
also led to increased risk of harm to humans and the environment.73
62. Marian Burros, U.S. Will Focus on Reducing Pesticides in Food Production,
N.Y. TIMFS, June 27, 1993, at Al, A21 [hereinafter Reducing Pesticides].
63. See Auvil 1, 800 F Supp. at 942 (referring to the Feb. 26, 1989 broadcast and
the ensuing boycott).
64. Reducing Pesticides, supra note 62, at A21.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67 Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (noting pesticide legislation introduced by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and
Rep. Henry A. Waxman, and support for change among industry groups).
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
73. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984) (citations omitted).
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FIFRA was adopted in 194774 and, at first, "was primarily a licens-
ing and labeling statute... [requiring] that all pesticides be registered
with the Secretary of Agriculture prior to their sale in interstate or
foreign commerce." 75 Originally, FIFRA also contained general in-
formation regarding labeling directions for use and warnings intended
to prevent harm to people, animals and plants 7 6
Congress undertook a thorough revision of FIFRA through the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, because of the
then increased public concern about the safety of pesticides and their
effect on the environment, and the fear that existing legislation was
inadequate.7 7 Under this Act, FIFRA became a comprehensive stat-
ute regulating all aspects of pesticide use and the EPA was given
greater enforcement authority and the responsibility for administering
FIFRA.78 "Congress also added a new criterion for registration: that
the EPA determine that the pesticide will not cause 'unreasonable ad-
verse affects to the environment.' ,,79 The EPA does so by weighing
the benefits of a pesticide against its risks.8 0
B. The Dual Framework of FIFRA and FDCA
The EPA regulates the use of pesticides on food under the dual
framework of FIFRA 1 and FDCA.s FDCA contains special provi-
sions which regulate the occurrence of pesticides on raw food' as well
as in processed food. 4 Pesticides on raw foods are specifically gov-
erned under section 342(a)(2)(B) and section 346 which allow for a
tolerance or an exemption to that requirement.85
The FDCA allows the "flow through" of pesticide residue to
processed food, even if the pesticide may be carcinogenic, for pesti-
cides which are given a tolerance or an exemption for use on a raw
agricultural commodity. This is acceptable only if the concentration of
the pesticide in the processed food does not exceed the concentration
allowed in the raw food.86
74. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61
Stat. 163 (1947).
75. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991 (citation omitted).
76. § 2(u)(2), 61 Stat. at 165.
77. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
Stat. 973, 997 (1972).
78. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991-92.
79. Id. at 992 (citing Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,
§ 3(c)(5)(C)-(D), 86 Stat. 973, 980-81).
80. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a), 136(bb).
81. Id. at §§ 136-136y.
82. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393.
83. Id. at § 342(a)(2)(B).
84. Id. at § 342(a)(2)(C).
85. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
National Agr. Chemicals Ass'n v. Les, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993).
86. Id. In this case, the provisions of § 342(a)(2)(C) are delineated:
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The FDCA also contains a provision known as the Delaney
Clause,s7 which dictates that "no additive shall be deemed to be safe if
it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or anmal....
1. The Delaney Clause: Distinguishing Old and New Pesticides
The Delaney Clause was enacted in 1958 and until 1970 the FDA
alone implemented the provisions of the statute. In 1970, the author-
ity to set tolerances for pesticides was transferred from the FDA to
the EPA.89 However, the FDA has maintained the authority to set
tolerances for all food additives other than pesticides.'
While the Delaney Clause, on its face, applies to all carcinogenic
pesticides, in practice, many carcinogemc pesticides are not affected.
The EPA distinguishes between "old" and "new" pesticides - only
new pesticides (those which have yet to receive EPA approval) have
had the Delaney Clause applied to them. Since 1970, when the EPA
was given authority to set tolerances for foods containing pesticides, it
has refused to apply the Delaney Clause to "old" pesticides ("those
which the EPA originally found bemgn but have since been found to
cause cancer"). 91
This conflict was addressed in 1990 in California ex rel. Van de
Kamp v Reilly.92 The plaintiffs brought suit against the EPA, arguing
that the EPA's failure to apply the Delaney Clause to "old" pesticides
was contrary to Congressional intent and that such failure jeopardized
the public health.93 The plaintiffs sought a determination requiring
the EPA to apply the Delaney clause to all carcinogenic pesticides,
regardless of when the chemcals were discovered to cause cancer.94
That where a pesticide chemical has been used m or on a raw agricultural
commodity m conformity with an exemption granted or a tolerance pre-
scribed under section 346a of this title [FDCA section 408] and such raw
agricultural commodity has been subjected to processing such as canning,
cooking, freezing, dehydrating, or milling, the residue of such pesticide
chemical remaining in or on such processed food shall, notwithstanding the
provisions of sections 346 and 348 of this title [FDCA sections 406 and 409],
not be deemed unsafe if such residue in or on the raw agricultural commod-
ity has been removed to the extent possible in good manufacturing practice
and the concentration of such residue in the processed food when ready to
eat is not greater than the tolerance prescribed for the raw agricultural
commodity.
Id
87 21 U.S.C. § 348.
88. Id. at § 348(c)(3)(A).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
90. Califorma ex reL Van de Kamp v. Reilly, 750 F Supp. 433, 437 (E.D. Cal.
1990).
91. Id. at 434, 437.
92. Id. at 433.
93. Id. at 437.
94. Id. at 435.
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The opinion focused primarily on whether the challenge was ripe
and on whether the decision not to apply the Delaney Clause to old
pesticides was a final agency action for the purposes of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act. It is significant to note, however, that this
court interpreted the plain language of the Delaney Clause to indicate
mandatory application to all carcinogenic pesticides. 5
2. No De Mimmis Exceptions
In Les v. Reilly, the Ninth Circuit continued to strictly read the De-
laney Clause, finding that the EPA had no discretion to permit use of
food additives once a finding of carcmogemty is made, regardless of
the degree of risk involved.96 Here, the petitioners sought the review
of a final order of the EPA permitting the use of four pesticides' as
food additives despite the fact that they had been found to induce
cancer." The EPA, notwithstanding the Delaney Clause, refused to
revoke the earlier regulations, claiming that although the chemicals
posed a measurable risk of causing cancer, the risk was de minumis. 
9 9
The EPA asked the court to focus on the general statutory scheme
governing pesticides (winch allows the use of carcinogenic pesticides
on raw foods), rather than at the specific language of the Delaney
Clause."° The court denied the Agency's request based on the prem-
ise that section 342(a)(2)(C) expressly coordinates the statutory
scheme with the Delaney Clause by "providing that residues on
processed foods may not exceed the tolerance level established for the
raw food."'' The court further noted that the statute clearly intended
that pesticides which concentrate m processed food were to be treated
as food additives under the Delaney Clause.'02
The EPA further contended that the legislative history demon-
strated that it was never Congress' intention to rigidly regulate pesti-
cides (as opposed to other additives) under the FDCA food additives
provisions. 3 On tins point the court agreed, adding that pesticides
needed to be regulated more comprehensively under FIFRA precisely
for that reason.1°4 Ultimately, the court held that there are no de
minums exceptions to the Delaney Clause and that if a pesticide resi-
95. Id. at 439.
96. Les, 968 F.2d at 988.
97. Id. at 987. The four pesticides at issue were: benomyl, mancozeb, phosmet
and trifluralin. Id.
98. Id. at 986.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 989.
101. Id. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 3(c)(5)(C)-
(D), 86 Stat. 973, 980-81.
102. Les, 968 F.2d at 989.
103. Id. at 990.
104. Id.
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due on processed food exceeds the tolerance established for the raw
food, it must be banned.10 5
3. Fruit Alerts: Alar on Apples
Sections 346(a) 106 and 3481' permit persons outside the EPA to re-
quest the Agency to set a tolerance for harmful pesticides. Accord-
ingly, in Nader v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the
plaintiffs sought a review of the EPA's decision denying their request
to revoke pesticide tolerances for daminozide.'08 Dammozide, a plant
growth regulator used mainly on apples and sold under the name of
Alar, was registered m 1963 and approved in 1968.109 Alar reduces
fruit disorders, increases size and firmness and allows the fruit to re-
main on the tree until harvest." 0 "Alar cannot be washed off the
fruit, nor will peeling remove it. The substance remains in the flesh of
the apple regardless of processing procedures.""' Scientific studies
found that Alar caused cancer in certain laboratory animals," 2 how-
ever, the EPA Scientific Advisory Panel found these studies to be in-
conclusive. Therefore, rather than revoking the tolerance, it proposed
to reduce the tolerance from 30 ppm to 20 ppm as an interim toler-
ance." 3 While the EPA's proposal was pending, petitioners asked the
Agency to revoke the tolerance altogether pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§§ 346(a) and 348. The EPA denied the petition and ten days later
published a final regulation reducing the tolerance as they had origi-
nally proposed." 4
The Agency stressed that the use of an interim tolerance would per-
nmt it to reassess daminozide in light of new data. No one filed an
objection or requested a hearing on the rule. Sixty days later petition-
ers brought their suit seeking review of the denial of their petition." 5
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 346(a) be-
cause the provision grants the court of appeals junsdiction only over
orders, and states that the denial of a petition does not constitute an
105. Id.
106. "The Administrator may at any time, upon his own initiative or upon the re-
quest of any interested person, propose the issuance of a regulation establishing a
tolerance for a pesticide chemical. " 21 U.S.C. § 346a(e).
107 "Any person may, with respect to any intended use of a food additive, file with
the secretary a petition proposing the issuance of a regulation prescribing the condi-
tions under which such additive may be safely used." 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(1). Thereaf-
ter, the Administrator must, by order, either establish a regulation or deny the
petition. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(1)(A).
108. Nader v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 859 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Auvil I, 800 F Supp. at 930.
112. Nader, 859 F.2d at 749.
113. Id. at 748.
114. Id. at 750.
115. Id. at 751.
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order.116 Thus, this case exemplifies a double message conveyed by
Congress to the public in its enactment of the FDCA. In theory the
Act creates a number of avenues for public participation and review
by appellate courts. In practice, however, section 346 states only that
"the Administrator may propose the issuance of a regulation upon
request of an interested person. He is not, however, required to pub-
lish the proposal, hold a hearing, or publish his reasons denying a peti-
tion.""' 7 As Judge Fletcher poignantly said, "Short of language
expressly precluding any review, Congress could have hardly drafted
any provision more deferential to the Administrator.""11 8
Another Alar alert was sounded in 1989 when the CBS television
program "60 Minutes" aired a segment highly critical of the use of
dammozide." 9 The show emphasized that the potential harm posed
by Alar was greatest to children, the largest consumers of apple
products. 20
The credibility of the news report was bolstered by an interview
with the acting EPA director, Dr. Jack Moore. Dr. Moore explained
the paradoxical effect of the two-tiered application of the Delaney
Clause in treating old and new pesticides.' 2' He confirmed that dami-
nozide is indeed a health hazard, noting that had it been a new pesti-
cide, under today's rigorous certification standards, it would not have
been approved for use.12
The television segment also included a report from the National Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC) regarding their findings in a study
of eight cancer causing pesticides. The report claimed the risk of de-
veloping cancer was approximately 250 times what the EPA had set as
an acceptable level of cancer in our population.123 The central prem-
ise in their findings was that the government's methodology failed to
take into account the distinct hazards faced by pre-schoolers. Pre-
schoolers as a class consume more food per unit of body weight than
does the adult population due to higher metabolic activity, which in
turn means increased caloric requirements. 124 Children also tend to
eat more fruit than adults. Considered together, these two facts re-
flect an inverse correlation between age and exposure to pesticides."
Two weeks after the interview and after re-examining the evidence,
Dr. Moore "decided to start the process of banning daminozide after
116. Id. at 752.
117. Id. at 755.
118. Id.
119. Auvil I, 800 F Supp. at 930.
120. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F Supp. 941, 944 (E.D. Wash. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Auvil 11].
121. Auvil I, 800 F Supp. at 938.
122. Id. at 937-38.
123. Id. at 939.
124. Auvil II, 800 F Supp. at 943.
125. Id.
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all."'1 6 But he neither declared Alar an imminent hazard nor sus-
pended it immediately. Rather, he chose to implement a five year
process of normal cancellation instead of an accelerated suspension. 27
Even though Alar was gradually banned from use, the sale and
price of apples plummeted, locally and worldwide. The industry even-
tually recovered through a rigorous educational campaign, but during
this transition period, apple growers and others dependent on the in-
dustry suffered losses totalling approximately seventy-five million dol-
lars.'" This case demonstrates the conflict often encountered by
regulatory agencies whereby they must weigh the health risks to con-
sumers posed by allowing continued use of a substance known to be
hazardous, against the inevitable damage or destruction of a particular
industry as a consequence of its abatement.
Similarly, in National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v.
Thomas 29 the D.C. Circuit was pressed to balance health concerns
against the economic concerns of the agriculture industry This case
involved imported mangoes and the use of the pesticide, ethylene
dibromide (EDB). The EPA had "determined... that the severe im-
pact of an EDB ban on the economies of foreign mango-producing
countries and the low health risk posed by EDB justified a level of 30
[ppb] of the pesticide in the edible pulp of imported mangoes through
September 30, 1987 130 Initially, the court of appeals held that the
"EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by... 'relying exclusively on
concerns of foreign well being .. .without considering the factors
specified as [relevant] in the FDCA.'"131 However, the court of ap-
peals did not immediately set aside the orders. Instead, it withheld
mandate for thirty days and directed the EPA to address the issue of
whether the interim level of 30 ppb was justified. 32
On remand the EPA determined that "an interim tolerance of 30
[ppb] of EDB on mangoes until September 30, 1987, is justified, and is
adequate to protect the public health, and will best serve the interest
of assuring an adequate and wholesome food supply."' 33
The court agreed with the EPA's determination that a ban of EDB
could "pose a threat to the integrity of the Nation's food supply."'134
However, in a separate concurring opinion, one judge emphasized
that the continuance of the tolerance for six months was justified only
126. Auvil 1, 800 F Supp. at 940.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 931.
129. 815 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Nat'l Coalition 1].
130. Id. at 1580.
131. Id. (quoting National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas,
809 F.2d 875, 876-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Nat'l Coalition Il]) (alteration in
original).
132. Nat7 Coalition I, 815 F.2d at 1581.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1582.
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because revoking the tolerance m the middle of the growing season
would cause severe economic harm for the foreign mango producers
who had relied on the tolerance levels.135 The decision to allow the
interim tolerance level provided foreign food producers with the no-
tice that there would not be additional extensions and that it would be
prudent to switch to other non-harmful pesticides.136
4. Conclusion
A recent New York Times article on the risks posed to children by
the use of pesticides1 37 demonstrated the government's awareness of
this serious health hazard. If the proposed change in policy regarding
the use of pesticides is fully carried out, the Administration claims it
will be a "landmark m the history of food safety"1 38 as it would sub-
stantially alter the methods of food production and the American diet.
This proposed major reform will involve the combined efforts of
three governmental agencies, EPA, the FDA, and the Department of
Agriculture, will create incentives for "safe pesticides," and will re-
move from the market those pesticides that pose the greatest risk.139
The plan to reduce pesticide use will also incorporate "integrated pest
management," a farming method using a minimum of pesticides,
which in turn, increases the use of beneficial insects and crop
rotation.140
It has been suggested that testing for pesticides should be done on
young animals whose systems are more analogous to those of chil-
dren.' 4' In addition, a recommendation was made to frequently sam-
ple foods that children eat in large quantities, and to observe all
exposures to pesticides, not just those from food. 42
135. Id. at 1583 (Green, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. See Reducing Pesticides, supra note 62, at Al.
138. Id.
139. Id. at Al, A21.
140. Id. at A21.
141. Id.
142. Id. While no final proposals have been submitted for approval, the EPA, the
FDA and the Agriculture Department are discussing the following changes which sug-
gest a greater compromise than the original publicity indicated:
I Dropping the "zero risk" standard of the Delaney amendment in favor
of one assuring only "negligible risk."
I Shifting the burden of proof on potentially dangerous pesticides, so that
industry would have to prove them safe. In the meantime, the Government
could begin phasing out suspect pesticides.
I Reorganizing pesticide regulation to speed approval of those more bene-
ficial to human health and the environment.
Permitting the Governor to change the labels governing pesticide use.
[and]
I [o]fferng stricter penalties against those who knowingly violate the pes-
ticide laws.
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Time will tell whether this Administration can accomplish this am-
bitious reform to reduce the use of chemicals in the production of the
nation's food. In the interim, however, two things are certain: (1)
proposals of this magmtude clearly demonstrate the government's
awareness of the need to change current practices; and (2) alerting
consumers to the potential health hazards caused by pesticides- (espe-
cially to infants and children) will increase the pressure on the govern-
ment to put into effect the reforms which they propose.
III. THE PROCESSING STAGE: FOOD ADDITIVES
A second area of consumer concern is the use of harmful food addi-
tives in the processing stage of food production. In 1958, the FDCA
was amended to address this concern. The Food Additives Amend-
ment of 1958 established a licensing scheme similar in concept to that
for pesticide residues on substances intended to be used as ingredients
in formulated foods. 43 It also applies to substances that become, or
can reasonably be expected to become, components of food (i.e. pack-
ages which contain food).
A. When Does a Pesticide Become an Additive
In 1974, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Ewig Brothers Co.,
Inc., held that what was unquestionably a pesticide chemical on a raw
food product, could also be a food additive after processing.1 " The
question before the court was whether residues of DDT 45 found in
smoked fish, were food additives within the meaning of the FDCA.1'
The court noted that Great Lakes fishermen,.unlike farmers and pesti-
cide salespersons, had no interest in adding DDT to the environment
or to the food supply, and that from the defendant's point of view,
DDT was not an item which was added to their product, but rather a
natural component of the fish before it was caught. 47
Defendants further argued that "a process, such as smoking, during
which nothing new is added to [the] food, cannot 'transmogrify' a pre-
existing component of a food into an additive."' 8 The court dis-
agreed and held that DDT found in the fish was a "food additive," not
Philip J. Hilts, White House Moves on Easing Food Pesticide Laws, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
20, 1993, at A14.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1958).
144. 502 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1974).
145. DDT, or Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane, is an insecticide widely used on
crops for pest control. It is distinguishable from other insecticides as it decays slowly
and is present m plants and animals. It appears m human beings as DDT remains in
the body tissues of the plants and anmals we consume. In 1972 the EPA banned
almost all uses of DDT, but it is still used in other parts of the world. WORLD BOOK
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1991.
146. Ewig, 502 F.2d at 719; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321.
147. Ewig, 502 F.2d at 718.
148. Id. at 722.
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protected by any tolerances, 149 and since they contained an unsafe
food product, the fish were "adulterated" within the meaning of the
FDCA.150
A factually similar case, National Wildlife Federation v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services,'5' involved fish caught in the great lakes
that were exposed to dioxin. 52 The National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) had filed an administrative petition with the FDA requesting
an interim action level and a tolerance for dioxin in fish pursuant to
section 346 of the FDCA. 53 The fish involved in tis case were
caught and consumed by sport fisherman and were not consumed by
the general populace. The FDA studied data collected by the Na-
tional Marine Fishenes Service and then determined the risks of can-
cer from such exposure. 54
The court stated that the FDA found that a nation-wide tolerance
and interim action level were unnecessary to effectively control this
problem and that an advisory warning adequately protected consum-
ers. 55 The FDA concluded that the consumption of Great Lake
sports fish would not result in significant dioxin exposure to the gen-
eral populationY.6 Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Young
v. Community Nutrition Institute,57 the court reiterated that the FDA
clearly had the discretion not to issue a tolerance even if a deleterious
or poisonous substance had been added to food and contamination
was unavoidable. 58
The factual similarities in Ewig and National Wildlife Federation are
apparent. Both cases involved fish from the Great Lakes and in both
149. Unlike fruit, vegetables and meat, tolerance levels had not been set in fish. IL
at 718.
150. Id.
151. 808 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1986).
152. Dioxin is any of 75 related chemicals all of which consist of carbon, chlorine,
hydrogen and oxygen. Used as a weed killer, it is difficult to dispose of, as it does not
break down in salt or water. WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1991.
153. National Wildlife Fed'n, 808 F.2d at 13.
154. Id. at 15.
[The] FDA concluded that most Americans do not consume Great Lakes
fish frequently, and that a tolerance would not protect Great Lakes sports
fishermen, the population at greatest risk. Its conclusion was based on the
following factors: (1) the area of fish contamination is limited to only a part
of the Great Lakes; (2) the species of fish most likely to contain dioxin con-
stitute only a small portion of the fish in interstate commerce; (3) only con-
sumers, such as sports fishermen, who consistently eat fish from
contaminated areas are at significant risk, and a tolerance would not apply to
such fish; and (4) FDA's findings indicate that although dioxin is unavoida-
ble, the levels of dioxin m the fish most likely to contain this chemical have
been decreasing in recent years.
Id. at 14.
155. Id. at 15.
156. Id.
157. Young I, 476 U.S. at 974.
158. National Wildlife Fed'n, 808 F.2d at 15.
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cases the fish were rendered adulterated as a matter of law based on
the fact that pesticide residue found in the fish was deemed a food
additive. Yet the Ewig court held that a tolerance was necessary, 159
while the National Wildlife Federation court found that a tolerance
was discretionary.160
The divergence in these decisions was based on the FDA's assess-
ment of the likelihood of exposure to the adulterated food. 6 ' The
court in Ewig was dealing with a processed smoked fish to be mar-
keted nationwide. However, the court in National Wildlife Federation
held that dioxin exposure to the general public was minimal and that
setting a "tolerance for dioxin contaminated sports fish.., would not
effectively protect sports fishermen because FDA does not have the
regulatory resources to control consumption of sports fish."' 6 2
B. Nutrients and Color Additives
Like pesticides, dietary and nutrient additives may also render a
food adulterated. Currently there are proposed regulations which m-
tend to limit the unrestricted use of dietary supplements including vi-
tamins, minerals and herbs in their present over-the-counter forms. 163
Under this proposal, the FDA would also prohibit potencies of dietary
supplements from exceeding the levels found in food. Any supple-
ment with higher potencies would be classified as an unsafe food addi-
tive."6 However, Congress also has before it two other bills which
offer alternatives assuring "the public's continued right to use dietary
supplements and establish[ing] an office for dietary supplements" al-
lowing the FDA to continue research. 65 One of these proposed regu-
lations could become law, 66 but presently, the cases below typify
issues which have arisen regarding nutrients and color additives.
In United States v. 42/30 Tablet Bottles, the Umted States sought
condemnation of certain nutrients, including "Geranium Plus" cap-
sules and "Coenzyme Q-10" capsules. 6 7 These nutrients were com-
ponents of dietary supplements produced by defendants. The
159. Ewig, 502 F.2d at 723.
160. National Wildlife Fed'n, 808 F.2d at 15.
161. While both cases in this section discuss if and when a pesticide becomes a food
additive, neither case was an issue under the Delaney Clause. Consistent with the
EPA's refusal to apply the Delaney Clause to old pesticides, the court's focus was on
whether the pesticide was a food additive, and if so, whether the FDA was required to
set a tolerance.
162. Id.
163. Alan Cass, Federal Agency Wants to Cut Your Vitamins, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 4,
1993, at A18.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 779 F Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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complaint alleged that the dietary supplements were adulterated in
that they contained unsafe food additives. 6 '
Both parties agreed that the substances m question qualify as food
within the meaning of the FDCA. Defendants contended, however,
that because Geranium Plus and Coenzyme Q-10 qualified as foods,
they were precluded from being classified as food additives under 21
U.S.C. § 321(s).169 Following the Second Circuit decision in National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy,170 the court held that a substance
does not gain immumty from being categorized a food additive merely
because it also qualifies as a food.171
Claimants further contended that the intention of the Food Addi-
tive Amendment was to restrict the use of chemical substances only in
the processing and preservation of food. The court agreed that
although Congress' main concern was with substances used in food
processing, there was nothing in the history or language of the Act
that indicated Congress' intention to limit the scope of application. 72
Furthermore, the court found that an examination of the legislative
intent indicated that Congress meant to treat nutrients as food addi-
tives.' 73 Congress did not want to leave the FDA without discretion
to regulate nutrients and other natural chemicals which could be con-
sidered food additives based on their potential toxicity.' 74
Consumer concern also focuses on color additives used to enhance
the appearance of certain foods, drugs and cosmetics. The Color Ad-
ditive Amendments of 1960 Ts established an elaborate system for the
regulation of color additives. The FDA, only after determining that
the additive satisfies the requirements of the Delaney Clause, 7 6 pub-
lishes a listmg of the additives safe for the petitioned uses. 177
In Public Citizen v Young,' 78 plaintiffs challenged the decision of
the FDA to list two color additives, Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19,
based on a quantitative risk assessment indicating that the cancer risks
168. Id. at 254.
169. Id.
170. 572 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1978).
171. 42/30 Tablet Bottles, 779 F Supp. at 254.
172. Id.
173. Id. When the Act was amended m 1976, the Senate chose not to incorporate a
provision which would prohibit the FDA's ability to regulate vitamins, minerals and
associated ingredients as food additives. Id.
174. Id.
175. Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1988)).
176. The additive cannot be found to cause cancer. See supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text.
177. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988).
178. Id. at 1108. This case involved color additives used m cosmetics and was ques-
tioned under the Delaney Clause. Color additives, however, must also pass muster
under § 348(C)(3)(A) relating to food additives, and § 306(d)(1)(H) relating to
animal drugs.
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presented by these dyes were trivial. 79 Specifically the Court was re-
quired to determine whether the Delaney Clause for color additives
was subject to an implicit de minimis exception. The Court held that
there was no de mimmis exception for carcmogemc dyes with trivial
risks to humans. 80
C. Accidental Additives
Occasionally, courts have had to decide how to treat additives acci-
dentally added. The general rule is that if a substance is added inten-
tionally or incidentally it is governed by Food Additive
Amendment.' 8' An intentional additive is one which is intended to be
added to food, while an incidental additive is one which may reason-
ably be expected to become a component of food or affect its charac-
teristics.1 82 However, if the substance is found to be "accidentally"
added, it is governed by sections 342 and 348 of the FDCA, the poi-
sonous and deleterious substance provision.'8 3
In Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Wemnberger,'84 the plaintiffs, manu-
facturers of a paper-food packaging material, brought an action seek-
ing relief against the seizure of its paper food-packaging materials
containing more than the specified amount of polychlormated biphe-
nyls (PCBs).
PCBs, a group of toxic chemical compounds, are often found in in-
dustnal waste and subsequently appear in other products. If the prod-
uct happens to be used for packaging food, it is not unusual for PCBs
to migrate into the food unless the food is protected from such migra-
tion by an impermeable barrier.1 5 The court of appeals classified the
packaging material as a food additive because without this impermea-
ble barrier the PCB's could reasonably be expected to result in be-
coming part of the food or altering its characteristics. The court stated
that the FDA was not required to wait until the toxic substance con-
tamed in the packaging material actually entered the food before it
could be restricted. 86 Thus, the court held that unsafe food additive
such as PCBs in excess of 10 ppm were "adulterated foods" and as
such may be seized under the FDCA.' s
179. Id. at 1109.
180. Id. at 1122. Six years later, the Ninth Circuit m Les was faced with the same
question m a pesticide case and emphatically asserted there were no de nummus ex-
ceptions to the Delaney Clause. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 9.
182. See Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Wemberger, 525 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.9 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
183. Gerber Foods Co. v. Fisher Tank Co., 833 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 1987).
184. 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
185. Id. at 1104.
186. Id. at 1107
187 Id.
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However, in Burke Pest Control, Inc. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
the court found that the residue of the chemical chloropicrin left on
empty beer cans was an "accidental" food additive.18 8 In this case, an
exterminator was engaged to fumigate a warehouse in which beer cans
were stored and an infinitesimal amount of the fumigant remained on
the cans. The court held that because Schlitz never intended to add
the fumigants to its beer, the addition was accidental.1
8 9
In making its determination, the court asked whether the chemical
had been added either intentionally or incidentally, thereby rendering
chloropicrin an additive. Since the fumigant failed both of these tests,
the court held that it was governed by the FDCA provisions dealing
with poisonous and deleterious substances and not one of the subse-
quent amendments.190
D. Conclusion
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its various
amendments provide comprehensive protection of food at the
processing stage. Additive alerts have come and gone and currently
the FDA's focus is on vitamins and mineral supplements. Critics of
the more stringent proposal which would restrict use of vitamins in
their over-the-counter capacity, emphasize the deluge of litigation
which will result on the State and Federal levels, as well as Constitu-
tional challenges relating to advancement of science, right to health
and freedom of choice. The more moderate proposal, allowing for the
public's continued use of dietary supplements while supplemental re-
search continues is a more reasonable solution. 19'
IV. FOOD VENDOR LiABiLrY
The last stage in our analysis of food safety concerns the convey-
ance of wholesome food from the purveyor or vendor to the con-
sumer. As early as 1431, the common law recognized an implied
warranty of merchantability in the sale of food.192 Today the Uniform
Commercial Code provides for an implied warranty of
188. 438 So. 2d at 95. See also Gerber, 833 F.2d at 508.
189. Id. at 99.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
192. Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292, 1311 (Cal. 1992) (Arabian, J.,
dissenting).
1993]
210 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
merchantability m the sale of goods 93 winch can be viewed as a form
of strict liability.194
For plaintiffs to recover under section 2-314 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, they must prove that: (1) defendant was a merchant;
(2) defendant sold him the goods that were not merchantable at the
tume of sale; (3) the lack of merchantability proximately caused plain-
tiff's injury; and (4) plaintiff gave timely notice of the injury to the
defendant. 95 Furthermore, section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code removes any privity requirement by providing that both express
and implied warranties extend to "any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured m person by breach of the warranty."'196
In addition to breach of implied warranty, the unfortunate con-
sumer of adulterated food may also have a cause of action in strict
products liability and negligence. There are currently three tests for
common-law food vendor liability: the foreign/natural test, the rea-
sonable expectation test and the Louisiana test. The causes of action
available to the plaintiff depends on the jurisdiction where the action
is brought.
Of the three tests, the two most often employed are the foreign/
natural test and the reasonable expectation test. 97 Currently, fifteen
193. The Uniform Commercial Code provides as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied m a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or else-
where is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may
anse from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1980).
194. Stacy L. Mojica, Note, Breach of Implied Warranty: Has the Foreign/Natural
Test Lost Its Bite? 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REv 377, 379 (1990). See also J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7, at 466 (3d ed. 1988).
195. Mojica,.supra note 194, at 380.
196. JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TwERsri, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
PROBLEMS-& PROCESS 111 n.1 (2d ed. 1992).
197. See Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1311 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The third test, the
Louisiana test, is used much less frequently than the foreign natural test and the rea-
sonable expectation test. Id.
[Vol. V
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states and the District of Columbia have adopted the reasonable ex-
pectation test, evidencing a trend in the law in that direction. 198
A. Three Tests for Food Vendor Liability
1. Foreign/Natural Test
The foreign/natural test developed as a result of the 1936 case of
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., where the Supreme Court of California
held that while an occasional chicken bone may appear in a chicken
pie, without further defect, the pie was reasonably fit for human con-
sumption. 99 The Mix court distinguished this case from other cases
which had dealt with harmful substances "unnatural" to the food and
held that in order to recover, the plaintiff must show that the injury
was caused by a foreign substance rendering the product unfit for
human consumption.2° The court asserted that bones natural to the
type of meat served cannot be considered a foreign substance and that
it is common knowledge that chicken pies occasionally contain
chicken bones.20 1 Furthermore, a food vendor or restaurateur was not
required m exercising due care to serve a flawless chicken pie in every
instance.202
Thus, the foreign/natural test asserts that: if a substance m a manu-
factured food product is natural to any of the ingredients of the prod-
uct, the food vendor is not liable. However, if the substance is foreign
to any of the ingredients, the manufacturer, vendor, restaurateur, etc.
will be liable for any harm caused by the foreign substance.20 3 Under
this test, injured plaintiffs have failed to recover for injuries involving
"a grain of corn" in corn flakes,2 4 a cherry pit in a cherry pie,205 a
pearl in cooked oysters2 6 and chicken bones in chicken noodle
soup.2 0
7
Critics of the test argue that the test yields inconsistent results as it
fails to take into account the extent to which certain foods have been
processed.208 Moreover, what is considered natural to a food product
in its original state, would not exclude body parts and bactena natural
198. See Mojica, supra note 194, at 394. Mojica recognizes 12 states that have
adopted the reasonable expectations test: Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington and Wis-
consm. Id. at 394 n.90. As this paper discusses mfra, Illinois, North Carolina and
California claim to have adopted the reasonable expectation test in 1992.
199. 59 P.2d 144, 148 (Cal. 1936).
200. Id. at 147.
201. IL
202. Id. at 148.
203. Goodman v. Wenco Foods, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444, 449 (N.C. 1992).
204. Adams v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 112 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1960).
205. Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 1965).
206. Title v. Pontchartram Hotel, 449 So. 2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
207. Roseberry v. Wachter, 138 A. 273 (Del. Super. Ct. 1925).
208. Mojica, supra note 194, at 398-99.
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to the product (bird claws, chicken beaks or feces, for example). The-
oretically, an injury to plamtiff caused by a chicken claw or beak m a
bowl of chicken soup would not violate the foreign/natural test. The
problem with this test is that it is based on a seriously flawed rationale
- that because a substance is natural to the food m which it is found,
it is fit for human consumption.
2. The Reasonable Expectation Test
The reasonable expectation test asserts that regardless of whether a
substance in a food product is natural to an mgredient, liability will lie
for injuries caused by the substance where the consumer of the prod-
uct would not have reasonably expected to find the substance in the
product.20 9
The reasonable expectation test was first referred to in Brown v.
Nebiker,21 0 where the Iowa Supreme Court denied recovery to a
plaintiff who died as a result of injuries caused by a pork chop con-
taining a sliver of bone. The court based its holding on the fact that a
consumer of certain types of meat should reasonably expect and guard
against the presence of natural objects. 11 The more frequently cited
case of O'Dell v DeJeans Packing Co. summarizes the rationale of the
reasonable expectation test:
If one purchases a whole fish to bake surely he or she could "rea-
sonably expect" to find bones in it. If one "reasonably expects"
to find an item in his or her food then he guards against being in-
jured by watching for that item. When one eats a hamburger he
does not nibble his way along hunting for bones because he is not
"reasonably expecting" one in the food. Likewise, when one eats
processed oysters, normally one does not gingerly graze through
each oyster hunting for a pearl because he is not "reasonably ex-
pecting" one in the food. It seems logical some consideration
should be given to the manner in which the food is normally eaten
in determining if a person can be said to "reasonably expect" an
item in processed food.212
When applying the reasonable expectation test a court must deter-
mine what constitutes a reasonable expectation. O'Dell asserts that a
reasonable expectation is one "in which the occurrence is more prob-
able than just possible. '21 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts clari-
fies O'Dell by defining what is to be considered "unreasonably
dangerous." Section 402A states that ".... unreasonably dangerous, is
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
209. See O'Dell v. DeJeans Packing Co., 585 P.2d 399, 402 (OkIa. Ct. App. 1978).
210. 296 N.W 366 (Iowa 1941).
211. Id. at 371.
212. O'Dell, 585 P.2d at 402.
213. Id.
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the ordinary customer/consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its character. 214
3. Louisiana Test
The third test evolved in the state of Louisiana. This civil law state
employs a two-pronged inquiry. If an injury is caused by a foreign
substance m a food product, the manufacturer or vendor is subject to
strict liability and the analysis stops. 215 If, however, the injury causing
substance is natural to the product or its ingredients, the manufacturer
may be liable only if the presence of the substance resulted from his
negligence in the manufacture of the product.216 In sum, if the sub-
stance is foreign, the defendant is held strictly liable and if the sub-
stance is natural the defendant may be found negligent. Under the
Louisiana test there can be no cause of action m breach of implied
warranty if the substance is natural to the product.217
In 1964, the Louisiana Court of Appeals applied this two-pronged
test in Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,21s a case in which the plain-
tiff brought an action for personal injuries caused by biting on a
cherry pit contained in a slice of cherry pie. Because the pits were
natural to the cherries, the plaintiff was unable to sue for breach of
warranty.
In deciding the negligence action, the court found that the defend-
ant restaurant keeper who customarily looked for and removed pits
was not negligent if an occasional pit went undetected and happened
to end up in a pie.219 The court applied the standard of "reasonable-
ness" to determine negligence, requiring that a restaurant use the
same degree of care that a "reasonably prudent man skilled m culi-
nary art, would use in selection and preparation of food for his own
table." 0
Under this analysis the foreign/natural test is employed to deter-
mine whether the food could be deemed unfit as a matter of law, but
the negligence standard of "reasonableness" is used to determine
whether a defendant could be liable m negligence for an injury pro-
ducing substance that was natural to the food served.2 1
214. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1 (1965).
215. See Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1300.
216. Id.
217. Id at 1299.
218. 178 So. 2d at 421.
219. Id. at 428.
220. Id. at 427.
221. See Title, 449 So. 2d at 680; Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1300.
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B. Current Cases: Nibbling Away at the Foreign Natural Test
The following three 1992 cases are illustrative of the shift in the law
away from the foreign/natural test and towards the reasonable expec-
tation test.
1. Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc.2
In May 1988, plaintiff purchased a sealed can of Katydids, chocolate
covered pecan and caramel candies manufactured by Nestle, and as
plaintiff bit into her candy she broke a tooth on a pecan shell embed-
ded in the chocolate.' She subsequently filed a complaint asserting
breach of implied warranty and strict products liability against
Nestle.'2 4
Nestle moved for, and was granted, summary judgment on the basis
of the foreign/natural test. However, on appeal, the lower court's de-
cision was reversed. The appellate court asserted a preference for the
underlying rationale of the reasonable expectation test which de-em-
phasizes the naturalness element, and instead, focuses on the reason-
able expectations of the consumer.225 The court rejected the
reasoning of the foreign/natural test as relying on the untrue premise
that consumers know (or should know) that prepared food products
could contain any ingredient natural to it.22 6 The court reasoned that
the naturalness of a harmful ingredient of a food product is merely
"one factor to be considered in determimng whether the presence of
the ingredient breached a warranty or rendered the product unreason-
ably dangerous."'227
Appealing to the Supreme Court of Illinois, Nestle argued that the
appellate decision failed to recognize that "perfection in removing
naturally occurring substances is impossible on each and every occa-
sion" and that they "should be exempted from strict liability due to
the difficulty of eliminating such matter."2z- Nestle further argued
that the Illinois courts should adopt the Louisiana test, but the court
declined this invitation, agreeing with the plaintiff that the Louisiana
approach resembles the outmoded doctrine of caveat emptor.229
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate
court's decision to adopt the reasonable expectation test and in so do-
ing noted three factors that it took into consideration when applying
strict liability to Nestle: (1) "the customer's reasonable expectation as
222. 589 N.E.2d 547 (IRl. 1992).
223. Id. at 548.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 548-49.
226. Id.
227 Id. at 549.
228. Id. at 549-50.
229. Id.
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to the contents of the food products";230 (2) the fact "[t]hat Nestle
actually processes the mgredients in its product before placing it in the
stream of commerce and thereby has some opportuity to discover
and eliminate ... risk[s] of injury"; 31 and (3) the fact that "Nestle's
product lacks the social utility of those products which justifies their
exemption from such liability."' 2
The court added that a manufacturer, such as Nestle, could avoid
strict liability by placing an adequate warning to the consumer on the
product's container stating the possibility of risk or injury posed
thereby.233 In conclusion, the court explained that even if it agreed
with the defendant that its product merits classification as an unavoid-
ably unsafe product, the court would still subject the defendant to
strict liability due to the absence of a warning of the unavoidable risk
of injury it posed.' 3
2. Goodman v Wenco Foods, Inc." 5
This case involved an mjury to the plaintiff's teeth which occurred
when he bit down on a small bone lodged in a hamburger purchased
at Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers (Wendy's)." 6  Plaintiff
brought actions in negligence and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability against Wendy's and against the Greensboro Meat
Supply Company (GMSC) which supplied the hamburger meat to
Wendy's.
The plaintiff "introduced into evidence a copy of Wendy's' grinding
specifications for its meat suppliers, which required that chopped
meat be 'free from bone or cartilage in excess of 1/8 inch in any di-
mension that is ossified' prior to grinding and packing."'' 2 7 The owner
of GMSC was called as a witness for the plaintiff. He elaborated on
GMSC's meat inspection criteria and the guidelines used in consider-
ing whether bone fragments were considered a defect. 3 He ex-
plained that meat was not routinely inspected after the grinding
230. Id. at 550.
231. Id. at 551.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 552.
234. Id. (citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToR-s § 402A, cmt. k (1965) ("an un-
avoidably unsafe product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous when properly
prepared and accompamed by proper directions and warming")).
235. 423 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1992).
236. Id. at 446 (the triangular bone was 1/16th to 1/4 inch long thick and 1/2 inch
long).
237. Id. at 447.
238. Id. The owner presented a chart which indicated that "minor" defects were
those less than 1h inch in any dimension and that "insignificant" defects were those
less than 1/4 inch wide, were flexible or crumbled easily. If a sample unit of 30 pounds
contained more than five minor fragments, it was considered a "major" defect.
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process but rather that Wendy's employed a strict random inspection
of meat which occurred several times a week. 3 9
In determining whether the bone in the hamburger was a breach of
implied warranty, the Supreme Court of North Carolina relied on the
case Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.24 In Coffer, a breach of implied
warranty claim was brought by a plaintiff whose tooth had been bro-
ken on a shell contained in a jar of nuts.24 Under the foreign/natural
test, no liability would lie, but the Coffer court added another dimen-
sion to the analysis. The court emphasized the quantity of such sub-
stance and whether it could be classified as injurious to health, not the
naturalness or the reasonableness of the substance's presence.242
The Goodman court concluded that "the modem and better view is
that there may be recovery, notwithstanding the injury-causing sub-
stance's naturalness to the food, if because of the way the food is
processed, or the nature, size or quantity of the substance, or both, a
consumer should not reasonably have anticipated the substance's
presence."243 Thus, the court held that a jury could reasonably deter-
mine the meat to be of such a nature and the bone m the meat of such
size, that a consumer should not reasonably have anticipated the
bone's presence.2 " This decision marked North Carolina's displace-
ment of the foreign/natural test and its preference for the reasonable
expectation test.
With regard to the cause of action in negligence, the court looked at
the North Carolina Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,24 which prohibits
"the manufacture, sale, delivery, holding or offering for sale of any
food.. that is adulterated."'  The language of the North Carolina
statute follows the FDCA and deems a food adulterated when: "It
bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health."' 47
The court was persuaded by the evidence at trial that Wendy's had
exercised due care in the preparation of its hamburgers by the use of
its grinding process and that, by itself, the fact that there was a bone in
the hamburger did not create an inference that Wendy's was negligent
in its inspection of hamburgers.248 The court did not want to place
239. Id.
240. 226 S.E.2d 534 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
241. Goodman, 423 S.E.2d at 450.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 451.
244. Id. at 452.
245. North Carolina Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-124
(1988).
246. Id. at §§ 106-122(1).
247. Id. at §§ 106-129.
248. Goodman, 423 S.E.2d at 453.
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defendants in the precarious position of having to insure the absolute
perfection of their food.2 4 9
With regard to the claims of negligence and breach of implied war-
ranty against GMSC, the court held that unlike Wendy's, GMSC did
not proffer evidence at trial which demonstrated due care in its grind-
ing regulations. The Court, therefore, held that GMSC failed to sus-
tain its burden as movant for summary judgment5 0
3. Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court"
In Mexicali Rose, the plaintiff, Jack Clark, a customer at petitioner's
restaurant, sustained throat injuries when he swallowed a one inch
long chicken bone in his enchilada.' 2 He brought an action for dam-
ages based on theories of negligence, breach of implied warranty and
strict liability 5 3 Before reaching the Supreme Court of California,
the court of appeals had held that under the principal of stare decisis
the foreign/natural test must be followed.5 4
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that "the foreign-natural test draws
an arbitrary line of liability, . . . and unfairly exonerates the
restauranteur [sic] from all liability simply because the injury produc-
ing substance happens to be 'natural' to the food served." 5 Plaintiff
further asserted that due to advances in modem technology over the
past fifty-five years it should now be easier to safeguard against bones
being left in food than it was in 1936 (when Mix was decided), and
therefore defendant should be held liable.5 6
Finally, plaintiff contended that the foreign/natural test should be
replaced by the reasonable expectation test257 and that defendant
should be held:
(i) liable in negligence for their failure to exercise reasonable care in
the preparation of the food, (ii) liable for violating California's stat-
utory implied warranty because a chicken bone in a chicken enchi-
lada renders the latter unfit for human consumption. and (iii)
strictly liable because the food item was "defective.",
258
249. Id. (citing Norris v. Pig 'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 53 S.E.2d 718,722 (Ga.
1949)).
250. Goodman, 423 S.E.2d at 458.
251. 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992). As discussed supra, Mexicali Rose is an important
case because it refers to and discusses the evolution of all three of the tests for food
vendor liability. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
252. Id. at 1294.
253. Id.
254. Id. (relying on Mix, 59 P.2d at 144).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, cmt. i (imposing strict
liability when food is "dangerous beyond that winch would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics")).
1993]
218 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
The California Supreme Court purportedly agreed with the plaintiff
that a reasonable expectation test is applicable in this context and that
it comports with the jurisdiction's development of tort law.2 9 The
court, however, put significant limitations on the reasonable expecta-
tion test, which resulted in a holding that limits a plaintiff's claim to a
cause of action in negligence (clearly echoing the Louisiana rule).26 °
The Mexicali Rose court offered the following interpretation of the
reasonable expectation test:
[(1)] If the injury producing substance is natural to the preparation
of the food served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by
its very nature and the food can not be determined unfit or defec-
tive. [The injured party] in such a case has no cause of action in
strict liability or implied warranty. If, however, the presence of the
natural substance is due to a restauranteur's [sic] failure to exercise
due care in food preparation, the injured patron may sue under a
negligence theory. [(2)] If the injury-causing substance is foreign to
the food served, then the injured patron may also state a cause of
action in implied warranty and strict liability.... [T]he trier of fact
will determine whether the substance (i) could be reasonably ex-
pected by the average consumer and (ii) rendered the food unfit or
defective. 261
As this explanation clearly demonstrates, the majority in Mexicali
Rose did theoretically reject the straight foreign/natural test. But
while they asserted that they had replaced it with the reasonable ex-
pectation test, they had merely created a camouflage of the Louisiana
test.262
Judge Mosk stated in his dissent that he found the majority rule
"bizarre in application to mass producers and distributors of
processed food, irrational in differentiating between natural and un-
natural contaminants and unfair in saddling the objectively unreason-
able - and truthful consumer with costs he or she had no way of
protecting against."263 Judge Mosk was also critical of the majority's
suggestion that courts across the country had moved away from the
strict foreign/natural test and that now the Louisiana rule represented
the majority view.2 4 As Judge Mosk pointed out, in fact, no other
jurisdiction had adopted the Louisiana standard,265 and that until the
Mexicali Rose majority adopted it, it had remained unique to that
state.266
259. Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1294.
260. Id. at 1307 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 1303.
262. Id. at 1307-08 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1305.
264. Id. at 1307-08 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 1308.
266. Id
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C. Conclusion
As these cases demonstrate, the reasonable expectation test is the
only test which assures consumers of food the same protection af-
forded consumers of other products. While the foreign/natural dis-
tinction is a relevant consideration, it should not be controlling, nor
should its results bar further analysis. Similarly, the Louisiana test
which limits a cause of action to negligence, unfairly insulates food
vendors from being held liable for unplied breach of warranty and
strict liability.
The trend in the majority of jurisdictions has been to replace the
foreign/natural test with the reasonable expectation test. An illustra-
tive example is found in Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.267 which
states that "[t]he 'foreign-natural' test as applied as a matter of... law
does not recommend itself to us as being logical or desirable."26 The
foreign/natural test while focusing on the naturalness of the substance
to the product loses sight of the fact that warranty of fitness of food
was a rule of liability imposed as a matter of public policy in the inter-
est of protecting health and safety.269 Viewed in this light, why would
it matter if an injury was caused by a chicken bone or a similar sized
piece of metal wire?270
The fact that a product contains only ingredients natural to it does
not necessarily render it fit for human consumption. With the excep-
tion of Coffer,271 very few courts discuss the amount of the deleterious
substance as being an important consideration. Moreover, the central
flaw in the foreign/natural test is that it totally ignores the nature of
the natural injury producing substance. Surely a consumer who bit
into a chicken patty sandwich only to discover himself munching on a
chicken claw should be able to pursue a cause of action in breach of
implied warranty or strict liability. The dissenting opinion of Judge
Mosk in Mexicali Rose states very bluntly and accurately, "We started
a wild goose chase.., when this Court declared in 1936 that when the
injury is caused by an object which is natural to the food being served,
there can be no liability. '272
The Louisiana test, is basically a two-pronged test with all of the
flaws inherent m the foreign/natural test. Only Louisiana (and now
California) have adopted this standard which limits plaintiff's cause of
action to negligence. 73 By disallowing implied breach of warranty
and strict liability as causes of action the courts seem to ignore the
intention of the Uniform Commercial Code in adopting these provi-
267. 201 So. 2d 824 (1967).
268. Id at 826.
269. Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1306 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. 226 S.E.2d at 538.
272. Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1306 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 1308.
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sions, which was that the injured plaintiff would not have to prove
negligence.2 74
So long as there is a foreign/natural dispositive component or prong
to any test it will yield arbitrary results. It is illogical to base a deci-
sion on this distinction, as an unanticipated natural object may cause
as much harm as a foreign object in food. 75
The reasonable expectation test, by allowing plaintiffs to benefit
from strict liability and breach of implied warranty, yields more equi-
table results than any version of the foreign natural test. The courts in
Nestle-Beich and Goodman represent jurisdictions which clearly have
adopted the reasonable expectation test. These decisions indicate that
the trend is moving away from the foreign/natural test and gravitating
toward greater reliance on jury perceptions of the reasonable con-
sumer's expectations.276
This Note has presented a panoramic view of the issues raised and
risks posed to consumers in the various stages of food production. Si-
multaneously, it has attempted to convey to the wary consumer that
government is not only aware of these concerns, but more impor-
tantly, has been and is currently actively seeking to remedy them.
The current administration, by bringing together the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration and the De-
partment of Agriculture, is addressing the risks of pesticides posed
during the growth of food and is determined to employ less chemically
intense techniques. Similarly, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act and its various amendments has and will continue to provide com-
prehensive protection of food at the processing stage. The final con-
cern of the innocent consumer is that food which is conveyed be fit for
human consumption. As courts continue to reject the problematic
foreign/natural test m favor of the reasonable expectation test, the
consumer's right to wholesome food is increasingly broadened and re-
mains consistent with one medieval lawyer's observation that "it is
ordained that none [shall] sell corrupt victuals." 77
Gail Kachadurian McCallion
274. See Mojica, supra note 194, at 407.
275. Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1307 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
276. Alan J. Lazarus, Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law, 28 TORT and
INSURANCE L. J. 354, 356 (1993).
277 Mexicali Rose, 822 P.2d at 1311 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (quoting Y.B. Hen.
VI, f. 53(b)(1431)).
